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It is widely recognized that the Euro area is an asymmetric monetary union which 
assembles countries with heterogeneous structures on financial, goods and labour markets 
stricken by asymmetric shocks. However, the main objective of the European Central Bank 
(ECB) is to preserve price stability for the euro area as a whole, and the ECB pays most of its 
attention to union-wide output and (principally) inflation, neglecting, at least on the level of 
principles, inflation and output divergences in union. In this paper, we wonder, at a 
theoretical level, about the social loss associated with such an objective based on aggregate 
magnitudes, and we search for solutions, namely an “optimal” contract for a common central 
bank. We show in particular that it is not necessarily a good thing that a common central 
bank worries about inflation divergences without being concerned about output divergences 
in union.    2
Should a common central bank in a heterogeneous monetary union consider national 
divergences, and how should she do it? This question is at the heart of the monetary policy 
matter in the Euro area. It is widely recognized that the Euro area is an asymmetric monetary 
Union which assembles countries with heterogeneous structures on financial, goods and 
labour markets stricken by asymmetric shocks. However, the main objective of the European 
Central Bank (ECB) is to preserve price stability for the euro area as a whole, and the ECB 
pays most of its attention to Union-wide output and (principally) inflation, neglecting, at least 
on the level of principles, inflation and output divergences in Union. In this paper, we 
wonder, at a theoretical level, about the social loss associated with such an objective based on 
aggregate magnitudes, and we search for solutions, namely an “optimal” contract for a 
common central bank.  
 
Inflation and output-growth divergences in the Euro area are well documented
1. In 
2005, for instance, the degree of inflation and of output dispersion, measured as the un-
weighted standard deviation among the 12 EMU countries was respectively about 0.86 and 
1.5 percentage points. These values reflect very different inflation and output-gap positions in 
the area (see Table 1) 
 
Table 1: Inflation and output-gap in EMU 
 
Year  1999  2000  2001  2002 2003 2004 2005 
INFLATION  0.72  1.03  1.06  1.14 0.97 0.85 0.86 
OUTPUT-GAP 2.52  2.06  1.67  1.77 1.84 1.29  1.5 
Un-weighted standard deviation of inflation and output-gap in EMU countries 




























Perhaps more worrying is the persistent character of these divergences. Since the 
launch of the EMU, the inflation rate was more than one percentage point higher than average 
in Spain, Greece, Portugal and Ireland, while was continuously below average in Germany 
(OECD, 2005). Furthermore, the cross-countries dispersion did not decrease since the launch 
of the EMU, and most countries have systematically maintained either a positive or a negative 
inflation gap against the Euro area average (Busetti et al., 2006, ECB 2005), even if some 
arguments plead for a decrease of asymmetries in the long-run (Park, 2002). Moreover, the 
enlargement of EMU is likely to emphasize the relative size of output-gap and inflation 
divergences, since the new participants’ relatively low level of economic development will 
                                                 
1 See, for example, the recent papers of Andres, Ortega & Vallès (2003), Altissimo, Angeloni & Ehrmann 
(2004), Musso & Westermann (2005) or Benigno & Palenzuela (2005). The ECB (2005) provides an analysis of 
the causes and  implications of those divergences for the conduct of the monetary policy.   3
structurally produce higher than average output growth and inflation rates (through a Balassa-
Samuelson effect), during the catching-up path. Enlargement of the EMU will also probably 
increase the heterogeneity in the transmission channel of the common monetary policy, since 
the new participants experience different processes of financial liberalization. 
   
  A number of recent theoretical papers have shown that the existence of asymmetries in 
the transmission of monetary policy calls for a design of monetary policies that takes into 
account national data and not only average or aggregated (EMU) data. The superiority of 
strategies based upon national data has notably been established by De Grauwe (2000), Gros 
& Hefeker (2002) and De Grauwe & Senegas (2003)
2. Despite these results, it seems that the 
monetary policy design in the Euro area is mostly (and perhaps exclusively) based upon 
aggregated magnitudes. For example, in the Governing Council congregation of September, 
09, 1999, President Duisenberg asserted:  “…our decisions today, again and as always, were 
based on a euro area-wide analysis (…) –and nothing else”. This point is strengthened by the 
declaration following the Governing Council meeting dated from March, 30 (2000): “as laid 
down in the Treaty, each member of the Governing Council is therefore well aware that he or 
she is not a representative of a country (…) but acts (…) in deciding the appropriate conduct 
of monetary policy for the euro area as a whole”
 3. However, while the common monetary 
policy does not address regional economic dispersion in its policymaking, a great part of the 
recent debate in monetary policy has tended to focus upon the implications of inflation 
differentials for the formulation of monetary policy (with few or no reference to output 
differentials). 
 
  In this paper, we construct a theoretical model to assess the benefits of a common 
central bank that worries about inflation differentials in a monetary union. We model a simple 
two-country monetary union in which monetary policy is designed by a common central bank 
that is only concerned about average magnitudes (inflation and output-gap). The common 
central bank possesses its own loss function (that we call “centralized” loss function), which 
differs from the union loss function, which is the average of national loss functions (that we 
call “coordinated” loss function). What is the cost of this “wrong” objective, in terms of social 
welfare?  
  In a homogenous union, without “structural” heterogeneity neither in the transmission 
process of monetary policy nor in the objective defended by the member states of union, the 
difference between the two loss function is irrelevant: using a centralized loss function or a 
coordinated loss function gives rise to the same solution, even if each country is stricken by 
idiosyncratic shocks. In such a homogenous union, neglecting regional inflation or output 
differentials does not involve any cost.  
Thus, in order to deal with costs associated with a centralized policymaking, compared 
with a coordinated one, one has to consider some degree of “structural” heterogeneity in the 
union. If the transmission channel of monetary policy is asymmetric, for example, a 
centralized policymaking is less efficient, from the union-wide welfare point of view, than a 
“coordinated” one, a result established by Gros & Hefeker (2002) and De Grauwe & Senegas 
(2003). In this model, we introduce heterogeneity in the simplest way, namely in the 
                                                 
2 In addition, several results in literature emphasize the benefits of using national information (De Grauwe, 
Dewachter & Aksoy, 1999, De Grauwe, 2000). Monteforte & Siviero (2003) find that the cost of neglecting 
national information may be very high (a welfare loss near than 50%), in contrast with De Grauwe & Piskorski 
(2001) who find a welfare loss about 5 to 10%. De Grauwe & Sénégas (2003) find that uncertainty reinforces the 
case for using a national perspective.  
3 But the Gonzales-Paramo (2005) indicates that “this does not mean that the ECB looks exclusively at the euro 
area-wide information”, but “analyzes all relevant information relating to the various sectors and countries of the 
euro area”.   4
transmission channel of the common interest rate to aggregate demand. Our model neglects 
other sources of heterogeneity in Union, such as labour market heterogeneity (in link with 
divergences in wage setting) or goods market heterogeneity (in link with differences in 
cyclical positions, levels of economic development or economic openness degrees, for 
example); not because these sources of heterogeneity are less significant, but because they 
exceed the pure monetary dimension. Furthermore, the heterogeneity of the transmission 
channel of monetary policy is a direct clause of concern for the ECB
4. In addition to this 
“structural” asymmetry, we introduce idiosyncratic supply and demand shocks. So, in some 
sense, our paper can be viewed as an extension of Gros & Hefeker (2002) and De Grauwe & 
Senegas (2003), with a precise modelling of asymmetry in the monetary transmission process 
and in the shocks that affect the different countries, in which we explicitly study the optimal 
contract for the common central bank
5. 
Our model shows that, under general assumptions, the inefficiency associated with a 
“centralized” monetary policy design (relative to a “cooperative” one) can be removed by 
setting an “optimal” contract for the central bank. This optimal contract penalizes the 
common central bank from inflation and output divergences in the union. We show that the 
form of this optimal contract is very simple: the penalties imposed on inflation (respectively 
on output) divergences correspond to the relative weight of inflation (respectively output) in 
the social welfare function.  
The interpretation of the “optimal contract” is straightforward: for monetary policy to 
take account of union heterogeneity, one has to force the common central bank to feel some 
aversion towards inflation and output divergences. If this degree of aversion towards 
divergences is well defined, as it is the case under the optimal contract, the common monetary 
policy produces the first best.  
This result must receive some qualifications. It only holds if the different member 
states and the common central bank share the same relative preferences for output and 
inflation stabilization. In others cases, the optimal contract for the central bank is more 
complicated, becomes model-dependent and does not necessary produce the first best 
solution. Thus, introducing inflation differential in the loss function of the common central 
bank  is welfare improving if she possess the “right” relative preference for output 
stabilization and if she also takes account of output differential. 
However these two conditions are unlikely to be fulfilled in EMU. Then, we turn our 
attention to situations in which the simple optimal contract cannot be implemented. If the 
common central bank possesses peculiar relative preferences for the stabilization of output 
and inflation, for example, our model shows that one can still find an optimal contract for 
monetary policy; but in the optimal contract, the penalties imposed on inflation (respectively 
on output) divergences are higher than the relative weighs of inflation (respectively output) in 
the social welfare function and are inversely linked with the degree of heterogeneity in the 
Union. If it is difficult to design a monetary policy that responds to output divergences in the 
Union, on the other hand, no optimal contract can be implemented. In such a situation, we 
search for “second” best contracts for the central bank. Our model shows notably that, if 
output divergences are not a clause of concern for the common central bank, the second best 
coefficient for inflation divergence is not necessarily positive. Thus, attempting to reduce 
                                                 
4 The relative size of “credit channel” or “interest channel” of monetary policy in EMU countries, for example, 
may produces divergent effects of monetary policy impulses. Such divergences are studied in particular by 
Coudert & Mojon (1995), Cecchetti (1999), Issing & al. (2001), Peersman & Smets (2001), Mojon & Peersman 
(2001) and Angeloni & al. (2002), Clausen, Hayo (2002), Penot, Pollin (2003), Ruth (2004), Berben , Locarno., 
Morgan, Vallés (2005), for example.  Moreover, the enlargement of EMU will probably heighten uncertainty 
about the transmission channels (Hefeker, 2004).  
5 Gros & Hefeker (2002) and De Grauwe & Senegas (2005) only consider symmetric shocks, but, as we shall 
see, the mix between symmetric and asymmetric shocks strongly affects the form of the central bank contract.    5
inflations divergences in a heterogeneous monetary Union is not necessarily a good 
prescription, if this prescription is not supported by an output divergences-oriented device. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 introduces the main characteristics of the 
model. Besides demand and supply shocks, we introduce structural asymmetries on the 
interest rate transmission channel. Section 2 investigates the cost of a centralized monetary 
policy design, relative to the optimal “cooperative” solution. In section 3 we assess the 
optimal contract for the common central bank, and in section 4 and section 5 we study 
respectively how the optimal contract changes when the central bank does not share social 
preferences for the stabilization of output relative to inflation, and the form of “second best” 
contracts when she does not take output divergences into consideration.  
 
 
1/ The model 
 
  Our model depicts a two-country closed monetary union. The two countries have the 




ii i yi h f απ µ =+ =         ( 1 )  
 
where  i π  is the inflation rate and µi is a white noise supply shock with variance σ µi
2 . All 
variables are specified in log-deviations (in particular, the natural level of output is zero, and 
all expected quantities are set to zero). Thus, relation (1) depicts a “Lucas supply function”, in 
which equilibrium output can exceed natural product only when some “surprises” are present, 
either because of an exogenous supply shock or because of an inflation surprise which 
produces an ex post under-indexation of wages. 
  Notice that, compared to Gros & Hefeker (2002) and De Grauwe & Senegas (2003); 
we suppose here that inflation rates may be different in the two countries. It is an important 
characteristic of our model, since we want to study the optimal way for the common central 
bank to take account of inflation divergences in the union. Thus, we cannot suppose, as these 
authors, that the central bank directly controls the inflation rate. In contrast, we must specify 
demand functions and study the monetary transmission process.  In order to focus on 
heterogeneity in the union, we specify very simple demand functions. In country i, demand 
depends on the union-wide interest rate ( ) r , which is the monetary policy instrument set by 
the common central bank, on the inflation differential ( ) i π π − , which depicts country i 
competitiveness  ( ()
1
2
hf π ππ =+  is the average inflation in the union) and is affected by a 
white noise demand shock () i δ  with variance 
2




ii i i ya b r i h f ππ δ =− − + =        ( 2 )  
 
Through the paper, we consider that in each country, demand shocks are made up of 
fiscal policy shocks ( ) i g  and autonomous demand shocks( ) i ν :  ii i g δ ν = + . 
  In addition to supply and demand idiosyncratic shocks, we introduce some 
« structural »  heterogeneity  in the union, and more precisely in the monetary policy 
transmission channel() i b . In order to deal with « pure » heterogeneity effects, independently   6
of average effects, we define coefficient  i b  in deviation from its mean. Let  ()
1
2
hf bb b ≡+  be 
the average interest-elasticity of demand; we define 
2 1 ε <  as the degree of heterogeneity in 
the monetary policy transmission channel, with: ( )  1 h bb ε =+  and ( )  1 f bb ε =− , with 0 ε >< . 
In the Appendix, we show that equilibrium solutions are independent of coefficientb , so we 




s y απ µ =+            ( 3 a )  
 
 
d yr δ =−           ( 4 a )  
 
and, in deviation: 
 
 
s y απ µ =+            ( 3 b )  
 
 
d ya r δ πε =− −          ( 4 b )  
 
For all variablexi , we define a symmetric component:  () f h x x x + =
2
1
 and an 
asymmetric (or rather an anti-symmetric) component:  ( ) f h x x x − =
2
1
. In addition, we have:  
xx x h =+ andxx x f = − . We consider below that these two components are independently 
distributed, thus: 0 xx σ = . 
 
  To solve the model, we write equilibrium in average variables ()
s d yy =  and in 
deviation( )
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And we can easily compute union product, on average and in deviation: 
 












       ( 6 b )  
   7
In equation (6a), we can notice that union average income does not depend on the 
heterogeneity coefficient() ε . This is also the case for all average variables in union
6.  
 
  We suppose that each country of the union is endowed with a social loss function that 





ii i Ly λ π  =+  ,  , ih f =          ( 7 )  
 
whereλ  depicts social preferences for income stabilization relative to inflation stabilization. 
We also suppose that λ  is the same in both countries, in order to focus on “structural” 
heterogeneity ()
2 ε  in the union. The problem of heterogeneity of preferences in a monetary 
union is an important, but distinct, question. Moreover, one can wonder why some countries 
decide to form a monetary union if they do not share the same preferences. Our model 
describes a union where there are no preference conflicts, but simply differences in the 
functioning of economies.  
 





hf LL L =+          ( 8 )  
 
  In contrast with this social loss function, based on the average of national loss 
functions in the union, we suppose that the common central bank chooses the union-wide 
interest rate
7 r , in order to minimize a loss function that depends on deviations of income and 




C Ly λ π  =+            ( 9 )  
 
  The common central bank chooses its interest rate by minimizing (9), knowing the 
values of demand and supply shocks. From the union-wide welfare point of view, on the 
contrary, what matters is the ex ante value of the social loss function 
U EL  where E  denotes 
the rational expectations operator. It is widely accepted that the decisions of the ECB are 
designed for minimizing an objective based on average euro variables rather than an objective 
made up of national loss functions. In our model, we depict this situation by the fact that the 
common central bank minimizes a “centralized” loss function ( )
C L  and not the union-wide 
social loss function, which is a “cooperative” loss function( )
U L .  
We first suppose that the common central bank shares the social preference parameter 
for the stabilization of output relative to inflation( ) λ , in order to focus on the impact of 
“centralized” versus “coordinated” monetary policies. In section 4, we consider the alternative 
case in which the central bank possesses peculiar preferences ( )
c λ λ ≠  
 
                                                 
6 This would no longer be the case if coefficients such as a  or α  were affected by heterogeneity.  
7 Since expected inflation is zero, r  denotes either nominal or real interest rate.   8
  To keep the model simple, we also choose to focus exclusively on a stabilization 
problem for monetary policy, and we ignore eventual average bias in monetary policy, 
resulting from credibility problems that could arise when the central bank has an output target 
higher than the natural product (here zero). Such an inconsequent objective would lead to a 
well-known inflation bias, which can easily be solved by the adoption of an optimal contract 
that penalizes the common central bank from inflation deviations. Walsh (1995) shows, in 
particular, that the optimal contract does not depend on the variance of inflation, but only on 
its average level, and that this contract results in a linear penalty on average inflation
8.  
 
In our model, on the contrary, the minimization of (9) relative to (8) will raise a 
stabilization problem for the monetary policy. In consequence, it will become necessary to 
modify the common central bank preferences for the stabilization of output and inflation – 
since only quadratic contracts may affect the stabilization properties of monetary policies (see 
in particular Rogoff, 1985 and Villieu, 2003).  
 
 
2/ The cost of a centralized monetary policy 
 
Let us now characterize the inefficiencies in monetary policy associated to the 
minimization of  (9) rather than (8), considering first that the different member states and the 
common central bank share the same relative preferences for output and inflation stabilization  
()
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All along the paper, we use the notations: ()
2
1 a ωα =+,
22
2 ω αε = , and: 
() ()
2
12 1 ω λα ω ω =+ + . 
 
                                                 
8  In our model, if k  is the output target of the common central bank, the optimal penalty for inflation deviations 




C Ly k c λ ππ   =− + +  
.   9
  A direct comparison between (10) and (11) allows identifying the inefficiencies in 
monetary policy. Results are summarized by the following Proposition: 
 
Proposition 1 
In a heterogeneous monetary union, symmetric shocks have to be less stabilized and 
anti-symmetric shocks have to be more stabilized than in a homogenous monetary 
union. If the common central bank minimizes a “centralized” loss function, which take 
account only on average quantities in union, its interest rate policy will involve an 













, we have:  11
uc ψ ψ <  and: 
22
uc ψ ψ <  if 
2 0 ε > . 
 
The reaction of interest rate to symmetric supply shocks is too large with a centralized 
monetary policy relative to a cooperative one. As a result, the union-wide average product 
will be insufficiently stabilized in (6a), while average inflation will be too much stabilized in 
(5a). On the other hand, in the cooperative regime, demand shocks are perfectly stabilized if 
the monetary union is homogenous()
2 0 ε = , but only partially stabilized in a heterogeneous 
union (since 1 2 <
u ψ ). Yet, with a centralized loss function, the common central bank 
continues to completely stabilize symmetric demand shocks, in spite of heterogeneity. As a 
result, average inflation and output in union are to much stabilized, to the detriment of the 
stabilization of deviations ( y  andπ ).   
These findings show that, concerning symmetric shocks, in a heterogeneous monetary 
union, one needs a less reactive monetary policy than in a homogenous union
9. 
 
  Concerning anti-symmetric shocks, by focusing on average variables of the union, we 
can directly see from (10) and (11) that the common central bank does not take these shocks 
into account, while she should do under the optimal interest policy ( 3 0
u ψ ≠  and  4 0
u ψ ≠ ). 
Thus, asymmetric shocks are not sufficiently stabilized in the union. Average output and 
inflation in Union are not affected, but the use of a centralized loss function increases 
divergences in the area: national quantities are not adequately stabilized. 
 
Notice that in a homogenous monetary union ( ) 0 ε = , our model gives rise to the well-
known equivalence between minimizing 
U L  or 
C L , since  2 0 ω = . Thus, if there is no cross-
countries divergence, monetary authorities can rely on a loss function based on area wide 
variables only, without implying any welfare loss in union.  
 
In a heterogeneous Union, on the other hand, the social loss will be higher with the 
interest rate rule (10) than with (11). To show this, let us suppose from now that fiscal policy 
is able to perfectly stabilize demand shocks ( ii g ν = − , thus:  0 δδ = = , we examine the 
alternative situation below). Thus, the union-wide ex ante social loss is, under the optimal 
interest rate policy (11): 
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where:  1 / X ω ω =    and:  () ( )
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Since:  1 YX <<  and: 
2 01 Xa λ ≤< + , we can easily verify that:  () ( )
Uu Uc ELr E Lr < .  
 
Figure 1 – Welfare differential as a function of heterogeneity
10 (in  %) 


























Let us now study how the welfare differential  ( )( ) ( )
Uc Uu EL EL r EL r ∆≡ −  changes in 
response to variations in parameters. From (12a-b), we obtain the value of the welfare 
differential: 
 
                                                 
10 Unless other information, we choose:  2 α = ,  1 a = ,  1 λ = , 
22 1 µµ σσ = =  and 
2 0.25 ε =  in all 
simulations.   11
() ()
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> . Thus, the more heterogeneous the union is, the 
highest the relative cost of a centralized policymaking is. In Figure 1, we can see that this cost 
is significant for admissible parameter values, notably for “high” or “low” values of λ .  
 
 
3/ Introducing aversion to divergences in the central bank loss function 
 
  Let us suppose now that the common central bank has some degree of aversion to 
inflation and income divergences in the monetary union. We depict this fact by modifying its 
loss function: beyond stabilizing average variables in the Union, the central bank attempts to 




22 2 2 1
2
C
y Ly y π λ πθ θ π  =+ + +          ( 1 4 a )  
 
where  y θ and  π θ  are the coefficients of aversion to income and inflation divergences, 
respectively. In this section, we search for optimal values for  y θ  and  π θ . The following 
proposition shows that we can find a simple optimal contract for the common central bank, 
such that minimizing 
C L  in (14a) amounts to minimizing 
U L  in (8).  
 
Proposition 2:  
If the different member states of the monetary union and the common central bank 
share the same preferences for the stabilization of output and inflation (say, λ  and 1 
respectively), the first best solution for monetary policy can be obtained by an optimal 
contract that penalizes the common central bank from inflation and output 
divergences in the union. In the optimal contract, the penalties imposed on inflation 
(respectively on output) divergences correspond to the relative weight of inflation 
(respectively output) in the social welfare function. Thus, the optimal contract for the 
common central bank is such as: 
*
y θ λ =  and 
* 1 π θ = . 
 
Proof: We prove Proposition 2 for a general case with ncountries and without specifying any 
supply or demand relation. 
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By minimizing this function with respect to r , we obtain: 
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If the common central bank minimizes a social loss functions based on average 
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∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∑∑            (16b)  
                                                                                                                
We can easily observe that expressions (16a) and (16b) are identical if  λ θ = y  and 
1 = π θ , so are (15a) and (15b) identical in this case. Thus, under the optimal contract, the 
centralized monetary regime with aversion to divergences is efficient and conducts to the 
optimal regime. 
 
  Proposition 2 shows that a simple “optimal contract” for the central bank can enforce 
the “coordinate” optimal solution. This result is similar to Walsh (1995), except that Walsh 
deals with inflation bias of monetary policy, while we exclusively deal with a stabilization 
problem of monetary policy. One important limit about Proposition 2 is that the different 
member states of the union and the common central bank must share the same preferences. If 
it is not the case (with different relative preferences for output stabilization  i λ  for example), it 
is in general impossible to completely remove the inefficiency associated with a centralized 
monetary policy, and only “second best” contracts can be enforced, but such contracts are 
model-dependent.  
 
Proposition 2 is established for a general case. In our two-country model, minimizing 
(14a) provides the following relation: 
  
12 34
cccc c rr ψ µψ δψ µψ δ +++ ==         ( 1 7 a )  
 
with: 
                                                 













 ∑ . Applied to the case of a monetary union formed by two countries only, this variance 
operator gives rise to the term: 
2
f h x x
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and we use the notation:  ()
2
1 1 y π αθ λ θ Φ= − + − and:  ( ) 2 1 y a π α θλ θ Φ =− + − . 
 
  One can easily verify that (17a) corresponds to (11) if: 
*
y θ λ =  and 
* 1 π θ = , and to (10) 
if: 0 y π θ θ == . Figure 3 depicts the social welfare differential  () ( ) ( )
Uc Uu EL EL r EL r ∆≡ − , 
computed with the interest rule (17a), as a function of  y θ  and  π θ , verifying the optimality of  
the 
* 1 y θλ ==  and 
* 1 π θ =  point.  
 































Let us compute the expected social loss 
U EL  under the interest rule (17a) for any 
values of   y θ  and  π θ . Assuming that fiscal policy perfectly stabilizes demand shocks 
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We can verify that Z X =  and Z X =  for  y θ λ =  and  1 π θ = , and that Z Y =  and 
0 Z =  for  0 y θ =  and  0 π θ = , so that expression (18a) corresponds respectively to expressions 
(12a) and (12b) in these cases. 
 
  Let us now compute the differential of welfare associated with a centralized 
policymaking compared to a cooperative one, namely: 
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2
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and we use the notation:  () ( ) 3 1 y π θλλ θ Φ= − − − . 
 
  Concerning the symmetric component of supply shocks, a centralized policymaking 





y ππ θ θα θ λ == − −         ( 2 0 a )  
 








 if there is no 
anti-symmetric shock. Concerning the anti-symmetric component of supply shocks, a 
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 if there is no 
symmetric shock. 
 
  We can notice that:  1
sa
ππ θθ ==  if  y θ λ = , finding the optimal contract of Proposition 
2. But for non-optimal values of the central bank aversion for output divergences (that is 
y θ λ ≠ ), there is a conflict between stabilizing symmetric and anti-symmetric components of 
supply shocks. Effectively, 
s
π θ  negatively depends on  y θ , while 
a
π θ  positively depends on it. 
Thus, if  y θ λ < , a situation that we favour in section 5, stabilizing symmetric supply shocks 
would call for a higher than one coefficient of aversion to inflation divergences () 1
s
π θ > , but 
stabilizing anti-symmetric supply shocks would require a lower than one coefficient of 
aversion to inflation divergences () 1
a
π θ < . The reverse is true if  y θ λ > . These results are 
summarized in Figure 4a:  
 
 
Figure 4a – Best value for  π θ  in function of  y θ  
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Before examining (in section 5) the potential conflict between stabilizing symmetric 
and anti-symmetric shocks when the optimal contract cannot be implemented, we study in 
section 4 how the optimal contract have to be changed when the central bank does not share 
the social relative preferences for output and inflation stabilization. 
 
4/ The optimal contract with independent central bank preferences for output and 
inflation stabilization 
 
Let us suppose now that the common central bank possess its own preferences for the 
stabilization of output relative to inflation, namely: 




2 2 2 2
2
1
π θ θ π λ π + + + = y y L y
c c         (14b) 
 
  We suppose, as usual, that the central bank is more concerned with inflation 
stabilization than society()
c λ λ ≤ . The interest rule that comes from the minimization of 
(14b) is analogous to equation (17a) above: 
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y π αθ λ θ Φ= − + −,  ( ) 2 1
cc
y a π α θλ θ Φ= − +−  and  ) )( 1 ( 2 1
2 ω ω λ α ω + + =
c c . 
 
Proposition 3:  
If the common central bank is more concerned with the stabilization of inflation 
relative to output, compared with social preferences in the Union, namely if 
c λ λ ≤ ,  
the first best solution for monetary policy can be obtained by an optimal contract that 
penalizes the common central bank from inflation and output divergences in the union. 
In the optimal contract, the penalties imposed on inflation (respectively on output) 
divergences are higher than the relative weighs of inflation (respectively output) in the 
social welfare function. Thus, the optimal contract for the common central bank is 
such as: 
*
y θ λ ≥  and
* 1 π θ ≥ . 
 
Proof: Suppose, as in the previous section, that fiscal policy perfectly stabilizes demand 
















=+                                                     (18b) 
where
12: 
                                                 
12 We can easily verify that: 
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  And the differential of welfare associated with a centralized policymaking compared 
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c θ λ λ = =  and 1 = π θ , the differential of welfare is zero. But if 
c λ λ ≤ , the 
differential of welfare is positive even if 
c
y θ λ =  and  1 = π θ
13. Consequently, the optimal 
contract for monetary policy is not  
c
y θ λ =  and 1 = π θ .  
Concerning the symmetric component of supply shocks, a centralized regime with 
aversion toward divergences produces the same social loss as the optimal “cooperative” 
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ω
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Concerning the asymmetric component of supply shocks, we obtain the same social 
loss under both regimes if:  
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13 Effectively, for  
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From (20b)-(21b), we easily obtain the values of the coefficients of aversion toward 
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This proves Proposition 3.  
 
These results are depicted in Figure 4b for 0.8 1
c λλ = <= . 
s
π θ  and 
a
π θ  are still 
respectively decreasing and increasing function in  y θ , but, when 
c λ λ < , the two curves 
moves upwards compared with Figure 4a. As a result, the optimal values of 
s
π θ  and 
a
π θ  are 
higher than they was when
c λ λ = . In Figure 4b special case: 
* 2.2 y θ =  and
* 3.4 π θ = , instead 
of   1
sa
ππ θθ == . 
 
Figure 4b – Best value for  π θ  in function of  y θ  ( ) 0.8
c λ =  






















In expressions (22), we can see that the optimal values of aversion towards inflation 
and output divergences are decreasing function of the degree of heterogeneity in the union 
()
2 ε . The more heterogeneous the union is, the lesser the common central bank should worry 
about inflation and output divergences under the optimal contract.   19
Let us examine more closely this apparent paradox. If the union was 
homogenous()
2 00 y επ =⇒= = , minimizing 
U L  in (8) would correspond to minimizing 
22 1
2
Ly λ π  =+  , and no contract would allow equalizing this quantity to 
22 1
2
cc Ly λ π  =+  . Thus, no contract would totally remove the inefficiencies associated with 
the “wrong” central bank loss function, as show the values of penalties in equation (22) which 
tend to infinity.  
In a heterogeneous union, on the contrary, imposing penalties on inflation and output 
divergences allows totally removing the inefficiencies associated with the “wrong” central 
bank loss function. Sufficiently “high” values of the penalties in equation (22) correct both 
the bias associated with a centralized policymaking and the bias associated with the particular 
preference for output/inflation stabilization. In the optimal contract, penalties have to be 
higher than if 
c λ λ =  (namely, 1), but the more heterogeneous the union is, the lesser these 
penalties have to be. Thus, the gap between optimal penalties when 
c λ λ =  and their values 
when 
c λ λ <  negatively depends on the degree of union heterogeneity, because heterogeneity 
gives an instrument for correcting the bias associated with the “wrong” preference parameter 
c λ . Taking the logic to extreme, in a strongly heterogeneous union ( )
2 ε →+ ∞ , the relative 
preference for output/inflation stabilization is irrelevant, because the optimal policy is: 
0
cU rr ==  in (11) and (17b), and the optimal contract is the same as in section 3.  
 
 
5/ Second-best contracts for monetary policy 
 
  However, the optimal contract does not seem to characterize the behaviour of the 
ECB. On the contrary, the recent monetary policy debate in EMU has tended to focus on the 
cost of a monetary policy uniquely designed on the base of union-wide quantities and on the 
difficulties for defining an adequate common monetary policy in the presence of large 
inflation differentials, with few references to income divergences. Effectively, it seems 
difficult to design monetary policy in function of growth differentials in the Euro area, since 
these differentials reflect structural adjustment and catching up of less developed member 
states, and arte outside the province of current interest rate policy. Even if inflation 
divergences also possess a structural component, they directly affect the central bank ability 
of defining a “good” inflation rate for the area, and the ECB does probably keep more watch 
on inflation differentials than on output differentials movements.  
In what follows, we wonder about the interest if “second best” contracts, in which the 
common central bank shares the social relative preferences for output and inflation 
stabilization()
c λ λ = , as in sections 2 and 3, and worries about inflation differentials but 
without being endowed with the optimal degree of aversion towards output divergences 
()
*
yy θ θλ ≠=. In other words, we search for the optimal degree of aversion towards inflation 
divergences in function of different (possibly null) degrees of aversion towards output 
divergences.    20
 
Figure 4c – Best value for  π θ  in function of  y θ  






















With both symmetric and anti-symmetric shocks, the degree of aversion towards 
inflation divergences ()
*
π θ  that minimizes the welfare differential in function of the 
coefficient of aversion for output divergences ( ) y θ  can be expressed as
14:  
 
() 1 y π θ θλ
∗ −= Θ −           ( 2 3 )  
 
Coefficient  Θ  depends on the variance of symmetric and anti-symmetric shocks, but 
for admissible parameter values, anti-symmetric shocks dominate even if their variance is very 
small compared to the variance of symmetric shocks. In Figure 4c, we represent 
*
π θ  as a 
function of  y θ  for different values of the ratio of variances
22 / µ µ σ σσ = , showing that anti-
symmetric shocks dominate even if  0.1 σ = . Thus, the relation between  y θ  and 
*
π θ  is most 
probably positive, pointing out the fact that, from the union-wide welfare perspective, a 
                                                 
14 In this expression: ( )
() ( ) ()
22
12 2 2
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ωσε σ α λ ω α σ τ λθτ λ α ω
 −+ + +  Θ=
  ++ + + +  
, with: 
() ()
2 1 a τ αα λ =+ + . 
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common central bank that worries about inflation divergences without taking care of output 
differentials would not be a good idea.  
 
 
Figure 5 – Welfare differential as a function of  π θ  (in %) 

























































In  Figures 5a and  5b, we represent the social welfare differential   
() ( ) ()
Uc Uu EL EL r EL r ∆= −  for two cases: a case with symmetric shocks only (Figure 5a) 
and a case with asymmetric shocks only (Figure 5b). We can notice that the bias associated to 
centralized policymaking can be totally removed  ( ) 0 EL ∆ =  for 
s
π π θ θ =  if there are only 
symmetric shocks and for 
a
π π θ θ =  if there are only anti-symmetric shocks. If both symmetric 
and anti-symmetric shocks are present, however, this bias cannot be completely removed 
unless  y θ λ =  (in which case  1
sa
ππ θθ == ).  
 
We can notice that when the common central bank is not concerned by output 
divergences  () 0 y θ = , solving the problem of anti-symmetric shocks requires a negative 
optimal degree of aversion towards inflation divergences (for our simulation parameters). 
This is also the case when both symmetric and anti-symmetric shocks are present, as show 
Figures 4c and 6.1 below. Independently of parameter values, removing the inefficiencies 
associated to the sub-optimal stabilization of symmetric shocks when  0 y θ =  requires a higher 
than one value for  π θ  (5
s
π θ =  in Figure 5a), but removing the inefficiencies associated to the 
sub-optimal stabilization of anti-symmetric shocks requires a lower than one value for  π θ  
( 0.8
a
π θ =−  in Figure 5b). 
 
In Figures 6, we depict the differential of welfare when there are both symmetric and 
anti-symmetric shocks. As we have seen, the differential is fully removed only on the optimal   22
contract (here:  1 y π θ θ == ). If the degree of aversion towards output divergences is set sub-
optimally() 1 y θ ≠ , on the contrary, the second best value for the coefficient for inflation 
differentials conducts to a net loss of welfare compared to the “cooperative” monetary policy. 
Notice in particular that, if the central bank is not concerned about output differentials 
() 0 y θ = , the best coefficient for inflation divergences it not necessarily positive, notably if λ  
is small. 
 
Figure 6 – Welfare differential as a function of  π θ  (in %) 



























National losses under the “optimal” contract 
 
A central question about the feasibility of the optimal contract for the common central 
bank concerns its effects on national welfare in each country of the union. On this point, our 
simulations show that, in most cases, there is a conflict between the two member states. 
Effectively, for a given degree of aversion towards output divergences () y θ , welfare is an 
increasing function of the degree of aversion towards inflation divergences () π θ  in one 
country, and a decreasing function in the other. Thus, one country only takes benefits from the 
fact that the common central bank considers inflation differentials in the union, while this is 
detrimental to the other.  
Moreover, if the common central bank takes care of inflation divergences () 0 π θ > , 
welfare is higher than if she does not ( ) 0 π θ =  in one country, while it is lower in the other 
country. This property arises whatever the degree of aversion towards output divergences is. 
In Figure 8 we plot national welfare loss differentials between a centralized monetary policy   23
with  0 y π θ θ ==  and a policy in which the common central bank has the “right” coefficient of 
aversion towards output divergences( ) y θ λ = , for different values of the coefficient of 
aversion towards inflation differentials. We can notice that only one country takes advantages 
of   0 π θ >  (country h if  π θ  if small or country  f  if  π θ  is large).   
  Figure 9 depicts national welfare loss differentials between a centralized monetary 
policy with  0 y π θ θ ==  and the optimal (from the union-wide welfare point of view) policy 
with 1 π θ =  and y θ λ = , for different values of the degree of heterogeneity in union () ε . This 
Figure confirms the fact that only one country takes benefits from the implementation of the 
optimal contract. Furthermore, we can notice that national welfare differentials are large, 
compared to the union-wide welfare differential.  
 
  Therefore, modifying common central bank preferences, even to implement the 
optimal contract, would be a source of potential conflicts between member states of the union, 





  Should a common central bank in a heterogeneous monetary union worry about 
inflation differentials? In this paper, we have shown at a theoretical level that an optimal 
contract for the common central bank can be found, from the point of view of union-wide 
welfare. This contract penalizes the central bank from inflation and output divergences in 
union. On the other hand, penalizing the central bank from inflation divergences only is not 
necessarily a better solution than a “centralized” policymaking that is only concerned with 
union-wide magnitudes. Furthermore, even the optimal contract is difficult to implement, 
because only some member states takes advantage of this contract, while it is detrimental to 
the welfare of others. Modifying common central bank preferences is therefore a source of 
potential conflicts between member states of the union.   24
Figure 8 – Aggregate and national differentials of welfare 











































Figure 9 – National welfare differential in function of the degree of heterogeneity 
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Appendix: Resolution of the model 
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and the optimal interest rate is:  
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22
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=− + + +                          (A3) 
and we find equation (11) in text, which corresponds to the minimization of (8). We can 
notice that all equilibrium solutions will be independent of b , justifying the choice  1 b =  in 
the main text. 
 
  The first order condition for the maximization of the common central bank loss 
function with aversion towards divergences (eq. 14a) is: 
 






y br a br br dL
br
dr aa
π αεθ αδ α ε µ εθ δ ε µ δµ
λδ
α αα
−+ − − −−
=− + + + =
++
   (A4) 
 
If  0 y π θ θ ==  in (A3), the interest rate becomes:  












          ( A 5 )  
 
and we find equation (10) in text, which corresponds to the minimization of (19). 
 
  In the general case  0 y θ ≠  and 0 π θ ≠ , defining  ()
2
1 a ωα =+and 
22
2 ω αε = , we 
obtain: 
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Thus, if  () ( )
2
12 1 ω λα ω ω =+ + ,  ( )
2
1 1 y π αθ λ θ Φ =− + −  and 
() () 2 1 y a π αθ λ θ Φ= − − − , we find equation (17a) in text, which corresponds to the 
minimization of (14a). Reintroducing these values in (A1a-d), we find: 
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